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Murder after the Merger: A Commentary
on Finkelstein
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan†
Critics have long sought the abolition of the felony
murder rule, arguing that it is a form of strict liability.1
Despite widespread criticism, the rule remains firmly
entrenched in many states’ criminal statutes.2 In “Merger
and Felony Murder,”3 Professor Claire Finkelstein reconciles
herself to the current state of affairs, and seeks to make “an
incremental improvement” to the doctrine. She offers a new
test for felony murder’s merger limitation, which she
believes will make merger less “mysterious” and its
application “substantially clearer.”4 Briefly put, Finkelstein
claims that to understand merger, we must recognize that it
is an analytically necessary part of felony murder that the
defendant commit two acts—a felony and a killing.5 Thus, a
killing merges with the felony when we have only one act

† Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director, Institute for Law and
Philosophy, Rutgers University, School of Law—Camden. An earlier version of
this commentary was presented at the Special Part Conference at Louisiana State
University Law School. I would like to thank the conference organizers, Antony
Duff and Stuart Green, for inviting me to participate. I would also like to thank
Doug Husak, Claire Finkelstein, Dennis Patterson, and Rick Singer for helpful
suggestions, and Sunny Rubino for research assistance.
1. See Guyora Binder, The Origins of the American Felony Murder Rules, 57
Stan. L. Rev. 59, 60 n.2 (2004) (citing commentators making this claim). Binder’s
thorough historical analysis dispels the myth that our current felony murder
statutes derive from an English common law rule that held felons strictly liable
for unintended killings. See id. Of course, whatever felony murder’s historical
origins, it is a separate question whether jurisdictions have remained faithful to
felony murder’s original rationale or have expanded felony murder’s application
to include strict liability. For example, California courts employ strict liability
language. E.g., People v. Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (“a
felon is held strictly liable for All killings committed by him or his accomplices in
the course of the felony”).
2. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 31.06 (3d ed. 2001).
3. Claire Finkelstein, Merger and Felony Murder, in Defining Crimes:
Essays on the Special Part of the Criminal Law 218, 219 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P.
Green eds., 2005).
4. Id. at 220-21.
5. Id. at 229.
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instead of two.6 To make this determination, Finkelstein
articulates a “redescriptive” test that tells us when the
felony can be redescribed as a killing.7
Despite this project’s potential, I believe that
Finkelstein’s proposed merger test, far from improving our
understanding of merger, further confuses the doctrine.
Finkelstein starts from the false conceptual premise that
felony murder requires both a felony and a killing. There is
simply no support for this claim. Nor does the promise of
this project bear out in the application of Finkelstein’s test
to actual cases. First, the test cannot be squared with two
other limitations on felony murder liability. Second,
Finkelstein’s test is guilty of the very arbitrary application
for which she criticizes other tests. Finally, Finkelstein
unsettles the law by turning paradigmatic cases on their
heads. Finkelstein’s theory, while claiming to refine felony
murder, ultimately abolishes the doctrine as we know it
and replaces it with a doctrine that seems even more
unacceptable.
In what follows, I briefly explain the current
limitations on the application of felony murder, including
the merger doctrine, and set forth Finkelstein’s argument
against current merger tests and her proposed
“redescriptive” test for merger. I then demonstrate that
Finkelstein’s initial claim about the structure of felony
murder is unsupported, and that her test cannot be
reconciled with other felony murder limitations, is
arbitrary and ad hoc, and leads to counterintuitive results
in paradigmatic cases.
Nearly every state criminalizes felony murder,
punishing, as murder, killings that result from the
defendant’s commission of all, or at least some enumerated,
felonies.8 To limit the broad reach of such provisions, many
courts have engrafted restrictions onto these rules. The
first common restriction is that the underlying felony has

6. Id. at 230.
7. Id.
8. Dressler, supra note 2, § 31.06[A].
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to be inherently dangerous.9 A second typical restriction is
that the killing must be in furtherance of the felony, thus
limiting liability when a felon is killed or when a police
officer does the killing.10
Finally, in some jurisdictions, there is no felony
murder liability when the underlying felony merges.11 To
explicate, if the defendant intentionally kills his victim, he
must first point the gun at the victim to accomplish this
feat. This action, assault with a deadly weapon, is itself a
felony. If this crime could serve as the underlying felony for
felony murder, the prosecution would never have to prove
that the defendant intentionally killed the victim. Rather,
the prosecutor could simply bootstrap from the assault
charge to a felony murder charge. To prevent such a result,
courts have held that some felonies merge into the
homicidal act and cannot support felony murder liability.
In Finkelstein’s view, the combination of the
inherently dangerous test and the merger doctrine render
felony murder ad hoc.12 When both rules are applied, we
are reminded of “Goldilocks and the Three Bears”—felony
murder liability seems to exist only in an odd middle
ground in which the felony is sufficiently serious to be
deemed inherently dangerous but is not too serious because
intentional homicides merge.13
To remedy this problem, Finkelstein focuses on the
merger doctrine, for “[i]t is here that the felony murder rule
encounters its greatest source of confusion, with results
that sometimes border on incoherence.”14 She demonstrates
the haphazard results brought about by California’s
integral/included in fact and independent felonious purpose
tests.15 These tests yield the asymmetric holdings that
9. See generally id. § 31.06[C][1].
10. See generally id. § 31.06[C][4].
11. See generally id. § 31.06[C][2].
12. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 220 (“Not only do such results seem ad hoc,
but it is hard even to imagine what a rationale for a doctrine with such wildly
inconsistent outcomes could look like.”).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 219.
15. People v. Ireland, 450 P.2d 580 (Cal. 1969); People v. Burton, 491 P.2d
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active child abuse merges because the parent’s intention is
to assault but passive child abuse—i.e., failure to provide
food and water—does not merge because the parent does
not intend any assault.16 Finkelstein also argues against
Texas’s same act doctrine because courts lack “the crucial
underlying concept of an ‘act’” rendering the theory
inconsistent.17 Another approach, deference to legislative
judgment, fails according to Finkelstein, because it leaves
unanswered whether the legislature had considered the
possibility of merger and also threatens to abolish felony
murder, as every instance of strict liability felony murder
undermines the legislative proscription that murder
requires purpose, knowledge, or extreme indifference.18
Finally, Finkelstein critiques jurisdictions that do not
apply merger because they leave open the possibility that
intentional killings, provoked killings, and reckless killings
may all be treated as felony murders.19
Finkelstein finds the root of the error to be
functionalist reasoning, the view that felony murder is
justified on deterrence grounds.20 Finkelstein claims that
felony murder, rather than being an instrument of
deterrence, is a descendant of the Catholic doctrine that
one is responsible for “all the bad effects of his intentional
wrongdoing.”21 The conclusion implicit in Finkelstein’s
argument is this: because courts have constructed merger
tests to serve deterrence rationales, such tests are doomed
for failure.

793, 801 (Cal. 1971). The inconsistencies resulting from these tests were, in fact,
recognized by the California Supreme Court when it abandoned both tests in
favor of a case-by-case approach. People v. Hansen, 885 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1994).
16. People v. Smith, 678 P.2d 886 (Cal. 1984); People v. Shockley, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
17. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 224. This was Texas’s test. Like California,
the Texas court recognized the inconsistency of the results, and altered its test.
Johnson v. State, 4 S.W.3d 254, 257-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (limiting the
applicability of the same act test).
18. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 226.
19. Id. at 227.
20. Id. at 220, 229.
21. Id.
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In Finkelstein’s view, the rationale for the merger
doctrine is not functional—it is “structural.”22 According to
Finkelstein, “it is an analytically necessary part of felony
murder that there be, at a minimum, two separate things
the defendant is doing: one that counts as a felony that is
not a killing, and another that is a killing. Merger takes
place when instead of two activities, we have only one.”23
Merger thus turns on a determination of whether
there is one act or two,24 and Finkelstein proposes the
“redescriptive test” as the test of merger:
[I]f the act in virtue of which the defendant satisfies the
offense definition for the predicate felony can itself be
redescribed in terms of the resulting death, we have only
one act under two descriptions [and thus, there is merger].
If, on the other hand, the act cannot be redescribed in terms
of the victim’s death, but the defendant did in fact cause the
victim’s death by performing some act, then the act whereby
the defendant satisfies the predicate felony and the act
whereby he caused the victim’s death are separate [and
thus, there is no merger].25

To illustrate, if the defendant commits arson and
inadvertently kills someone in the building, the act by
which the defendant is guilty of arson is the same act as
the act by which the defendant kills the victim, and the
arson merges.26
As Finkelstein recognizes, this redescriptive test runs
into immediate difficulties. Under the Davidsonian account
of action identity that she adopts, an action can always be
redescribed in terms of its consequences.27 But then, the
22. Id. at 220.
23. Id. at 229.
24. Id. at 230.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 231.
27. Id. Finkelstein asserts that Davidson’s view is the “standard account,” id.,
and does not defend it against other theories of action identity. In contrast to
Davidson, Alvin Goldman claims that flicking a light switch and turning on a
light are not the same action. Alvin I. Goldman, A Theory of Human Action 5
(1970). Why? Because the relationship between the two is asymmetric and
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merger exception swallows the felony murder rule. In every
case where felony murder might be thought to apply, the
death is certainly a consequence of the commission of the
felony.28 To illustrate, Finkelstein presents a hypothetical
case in which she decides to hold up a liquor store, points a
gun at the cashier, and the gun accidentally discharges.29
Because a consequence of “robbing the store” was “killing
the cashier,” the redescriptive test yields that the felonious
action can be redescribed as a killing; thus, the robbery
merges. Such a result is problematic, according to
Finkelstein, because “a killing during an armed robbery is
the classic case of felony murder.”30
To resolve this problem, Finkelstein amends
Davidson’s test and argues that an action cannot be
redescribed in terms of all of its consequences, at least
insofar as we view the consequences of an action to be those
things for which the action is a necessary antecedent
(roughly, a but-for cause).31 While rejecting the concept of
proximate causation in favor of the language of
redescription,32 Finkelstein incorporates Hart and Honoré’s
direct cause test into her theory of action identity.33 The
result is that a predicate felony cannot be redescribed as a

irreflexive. Id. That is, we cannot switch the order—I do not flick the switch by
turning on the light (indicating an asymmetric causal relationship) and I do not
turn on the light by turning on the light (thus it is irreflexive). Id. Hence, to
Goldman, these items cannot be identical, and are therefore different actions. Of
course, had Finkelstein adopted Goldman’s view, felonies would never merge
because there would always be two actions.
28. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 231.
29. Id. at 232.
30. Id.
31. Id. She presents the following example:
A stabs B, with the result that B is seriously wounded and must be rushed
to the hospital. While in the hospital, C, a malicious interloper, disguises
himself as a surgeon and intentionally operates badly on B, with the result
that B dies. B’s dying is among the consequences of A’s stabbing B. But did
A kill B? I do not think he did.
Id.
32. Id. at 232-35 & n.40 (“it seems to me more helpful to speak of redescription
than of causation”).
33. Id. at 235 n.40; see generally H.L.A. Hart & Tony Honoré, Causation in
the Law 68-83 (2d ed. 1985).
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killing in those instances where Hart and Honoré would
claim that a coincidence or a voluntary human actor
intervened.
Finkelstein next applies her test to a host of cases.
Kidnapping typically will not merge because the act of
unlawfully “removing a person from her home does not
carry death with it as among the ordinary consequences of
the act.”34 Moreover, when the kidnapper intentionally kills
the victim, such a case will not merge because the
defendant’s own voluntary act breaks the “redescriptive”
chain.35 Both active and passive child abuse cases will
merge because in both instances, the natural consequence
is the death of the child.36 Finkelstein also claims that
robberies and burglaries typically will not merge.37
Finally, Finkelstein addresses two seemingly peculiar
features of her test. First, arsons, contrary to previous
treatment, will now merge, and secondly, the redescriptive
test will give different answers to the same underlying
felony depending upon the act by which the defendant
satisfies the offense definition.38 Thus, a burglary
perpetrated by breaking likely will not merge but a
burglary perpetrated by remaining might.39
I must say that I admire the order that Finkelstein
attempts to bring to merger. Bringing clarity to doctrinal
chaos is an admirable goal. Finkelstein’s project is all the
more worthwhile because, rather than make another cry
for abolition that will fall upon deaf ears, she hopes to
practically, if only incrementally, improve a problematic
doctrine. Unfortunately, I believe that Finkelstein’s project
is misconceived from the inception and that a theory of
action identity has little to tell us about merger or felony
murder.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 235.
Id.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 235-36.
Id. at 237-39.
Id. at 239.
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Finkelstein’s entire test and its later application
depend on her claim that it is an “analytically necessary”
part of felony murder that there be both a felony and a
killing.40 For this claim there is no support.41 Finkelstein’s
move from the claim that felony murder is a descendant of
the Catholic doctrine that one is responsible for all the bad
effects of one’s wrongful action to the claim that felony
murder requires two separate actions is a non sequitur.42
Indeed, if anything, Finkelstein’s discussion of felony
murder’s ancestry seems to point in just the opposite
direction. Why is it that felony murder requires two
separate acts, as opposed to one wrongful act with bad
effects? Finkelstein provides no argument. There is simply
no reason to believe that felony murder requires both a
felony and a killing.
Additionally, Guyora Binder’s extensive study of felony
murder rules does not support Finkelstein’s claim. After
examining the origins of felony murder statutes as they
were promulgated in individual states, Binder’s assessment
is that “felony murder liability has no single rationale or
function, no necessary form or scope.”43 Thus, the various
and disparate uses of felony murder liability in individual
states belie Finkelstein’s broad generalization about the
necessary structure of felony murder.
Even though the grounds for Finkelstein’s
redescriptive test are dubious, we may nevertheless wish to
consider whether it is effective. Does it make merger less
“mysterious” and “substantially clearer?”44 I am afraid it
does not.
40. Id. at 229.
41. In Garrett v. State, the Texas court faced the question of whether an
aggravated assault could support felony murder. 573 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Crim. App.
1978). The court noted that allowing this sort of bootstrapping would undermine
the legislative intent, and thus, set forth a “same act” test. Id. at 546. In
articulating this test, the court engaged in functional, not structural, analysis,
and thus, the case provides no support for Finkelstein’s claim. Notably, the same
act test has now been limited in Texas to the specific crime at issue in Garrett.
Johnson v. State, 4 S.W.3d 254, 257-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
42. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 229.
43. Binder, supra note 1, at 203.
44. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 220-21.
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One significant difficulty is that Finkelstein’s merger
test cannot be squared with two other limitations on felony
murder—that the felony must be inherently dangerous and
that the killing must be in furtherance of the felony.
Finkelstein’s test ultimately eviscerates both of these
limitations. Consider the marriage of Finkelstein’s merger
test with the inherently dangerous felony limitation.
Finkelstein claims that “we can entirely dispense with the
inherently dangerous requirement” once we apply her merger
test.45 Not only can we dispense this requirement, we have
to. There is just about nothing left of felony murder after we
restrict felony murder to those felonies that foreseeably risk
death but find merger whenever the felony may be
redescribed as a killing. If the death is foreseeable (and thus
inherently dangerous) then it is should also merge, because
such a foreseeable death is unlikely to be a coincidence
under Hart and Honoré’s test, which requires, inter alia,
that the event be statistically unlikely and that the second
event (the putative coincidence) be independent of the
defendant’s conduct.46 Combining the tests, it seems that
only bizarre cases would not merge: a death must be
foreseeable but the causal route by which this particular
death occurs must be deviant. Hence, felony murder is
almost nonsensical if we both apply Finkelstein’s
redescriptive test and require that the felony be inherently
dangerous.47 Thus, to preserve Finkelstein’s merger test, we
45. Id. at 237 (emphasis added).
46. See People v. Patterson, 778 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1989) (defining inherently
dangerous as requiring that the offense carry a “high probability” that death will
result); Hart & Honoré, supra note 33, at 78 (setting forth the requirements for a
coincidence that breaks the causal chain).
47. The only alternative to this result is to view felony murder provisions as a
way of grading murders. That is, murders that occur within the course of a felony
are first-degree murders. The Michigan Supreme Court interpreted its felony
murder statute in this manner, and found that the statute abrogated the common
law felony murder rule, which held defendants strict liable for deaths that
occurred during the course of a felony. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich.
1980). But given that the California Supreme Court ultimately rejected such a
reading of its identical statute, one cannot say that felony murder must as a
matter of analytical necessity be a grading mechanism. See People v. Dillon, 668
P.2d 697 (Cal. 1983). What prevents California from choosing to punish
unintentional killings during the course of a felony as murder?
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must dispense with the inherently dangerous limitation—a
result that Finkelstein both recognizes and endorses.
The question is whether Finkelstein should count
among the arguments for her position that her test
eviscerates the inherently dangerous felony requirement.
Or, why is it that “the imposition of an inherently
dangerous requirement tends to get matters backwards”?48
It seems perfectly legitimate for jurisdictions to limit the
application of the felony murder rule to those felonies, like
rape and robbery, which are inherently dangerous. Indeed,
Guyora Binder’s extensive study of the history of felony
murder tells us that felony murder, rather than having the
broad, strict liability application previously supposed, was
often limited to specific enumerated felonies where the
commission of such felonies demonstrated recklessness.49
Yet, Finkelstein’s rule renders the commission of many
inherently dangerous felonies, especially those that
demonstrate recklessness, as ineligible for felony murder
under a merger theory. Why is this the preferable result?
Another problem with Finkelstein’s merger test is how it
awkwardly incorporates the “in furtherance” requirement. If
a police officer intervenes in the robbery, shoots at the
defendant, but misses and kills the victim, is this an instance
of felony murder? This is now a merger problem under
Finkelstein’s analysis. To analyze this problem under Hart
and Honoré’s test, we might say the police officer’s actions
were not voluntary, as they were done out of necessity, and
they were not coincidental. Thus, there is no break in the
causal/redescriptive chain, and the police officer’s shooting of
the victim qualifies as an action by the defendant. Thus,
according to Finkelstein, there should be merger and no
felony murder liability. This result, of course, is directly
contrary to the “proximate cause” test adopted by a minority
of jurisdictions where it is the very fact that the police officer’s
behavior was proximately caused by the defendant that
renders the defendant liable for felony murder.50
48. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 237.
49. Binder, supra note 1, at 207.
50. See Dressler, supra note 2, § 31.06[C][4][c].
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More troubling still is squaring this result with the
majority rule—the agency approach, which holds that a
defendant is not liable for acts of non-felons.51 While both
Finkelstein’s merger test and the agency test hold that
felons are not responsible for the acts of third parties, the
theories behind the tests are diametrically opposed.
Finkelstein’s test yields that because the “redescriptive
chain” between the felon’s action and the ultimate killing of
the victim is not broken by the police officer, the police
officer’s action is the defendant’s action. This is antithetical
to the agency approach’s rationale, which claims that the
police officer is not the felon’s agent, and thus the felon is
not responsible for the police officer’s actions.
At this point, Finkelstein is asking us to take much on
faith. She offers no underlying rationale for her test, and
now, we must accept her test not only for merger but also
as the only significant limitation applicable to felony
murder. The burden now is extremely high for Finkelstein.
We should expect that Finkelstein’s test makes
incremental progress (at the very least), and gives us a
more coherent approach to merger. It does not.
First, Finkelstein’s test is just as arbitrary and ad hoc
as the tests that Finkelstein criticizes. Finkelstein’s test
ultimately includes only those cases where the defendant
commits a felony and then commits a second voluntary act.
So, if a rapist continuously presses his hand against the
victim’s throat, thereby satisfying the force requirement for
rape while simultaneously killing the victim, he will not be
guilty of felony murder. There is only one act. But if this
same rapist stops for a moment to scratch his nose and
then reapplies force that kills the victim, then there is
felony murder liability. I see no principled rationale for
such a distinction.
Finkelstein partially responds to this complaint when
she discusses what she terms the “‘double assault’” case—
e.g., two punches in the nose where the second one results

51. See id. § 31.06[C][4][b].
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in death,52 but her solution is ad hoc. She states, “[w]here
there are two acts of the defendant’s of the same type,
followed in quick succession by one another, we should
regard the defendant as engaged in a single activity and
treat the merger requirement for felony murder as not [sic]
met.”53 Finkelstein leaves wholly unexplained the range of
cases to which her rule applies or what grounds this
amendment to action identity theory. This is simply an ad
hoc attempt to deal with a counterintuitive aspect of her
proposal.
Second, Finkelstein’s test leads to counterintuitive
results in paradigmatic cases. Consider armed robbery.
Returning to Finkelstein’s liquor store robbery (wherein
she points the gun at the cashier and the gun accidentally
discharges), she claims that this robbery does not merge
“because it is only in an attenuated sense that my threat
causes the death of clerk.”54 Why? Robbery requires the
threat of serious bodily injury,55 and pointing a gun at
someone constitutes reckless endangerment.56 Given that
Finkelstein views arson as merging because “setting a
building or a truck on fire is a highly dangerous activity,
one that may very well lead to a loss of human life in the
ordinary course of events,”57 it seems that this case of
robbery should also merge. Yet, as Finkelstein herself
claims, armed robberies of this type are classic cases of
felony murder.58
Now, consider a second typical felony murder case.
Imagine that the cashier sees the gun and dies of a heart
attack.59 Under Finkelstein’s analysis, this case cannot

52. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 239.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 235.
55. Model Penal Code § 221.1(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
56. Id. § 211.2.
57. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 238.
58. Id. at 232.
59. Original application of the felony murder rule did not include heart attack
cases. Binder, supra note 1, at 196. However, current courts do apply felony
murder rules in these situations. People v. Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969); State v. Dixon, 387 N.W.2d 682 (Neb. 1986).
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support felony murder liability. First, it seems likely that
this case should merge because pointing the gun should be
redescribed as the killing. Such a situation is quite
frightening, and thus, a victim having a heart attack is
hardly coincidental. Second, even if this case does not
merge, we now have a second problem. We still do not know
if this is a case of felony murder. For felony murder, we
need two things according to Finkelstein: an act that is the
felony and an act that is the killing. That is, Finkelstein
has given us a new requirement for felony murder. Not
only must we look to see if the defendant’s conduct can be
redescribed as a killing, but if it cannot, we still need a
second act—a killing—by the defendant. In the heart
attack case, however, there is no second act. The defendant
points the gun, it scares the victim, and the victim dies. So,
if pointing the gun is the killing, there is merger, but if
pointing the gun is not the killing, then no one kills the
cashier because there is not a second voluntary act by the
defendant that can be described as a killing.
Finally, let us apply Finkelstein’s test to what has
always been viewed as the definitive case for merger:
provoked killings, e.g., those cases that are mitigated from
murder to manslaughter because reasonable provocation
led the defendant to kill the victim. Notably, Finkelstein
criticizes jurisdictions that do not have a merger rule
because, among other reasons, they “eliminate any
opportunity for defendants to claim provocation.”60 So, we
should expect to find merger under Finkelstein’s test in
provocation cases.
Let us assume that the defendant, having witnessed
the victim horribly attack her child (but without any ability
to intervene), follows the victim home, breaks into his
house, pulls a gun, and shoots the victim. First, we might
consider burglary as the predicate felony. Here, Finkelstein
tell us the answer: this type of burglary will not merge:
“entering a dwelling, even when the purpose is to bring
about a later killing, cannot itself be redescribed as
60. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 227.
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killing. . . . [because] the defendant’s own later voluntary
act (of attacking, assaulting, or killing) breaks the
redescriptive chain from entering a dwelling to the victim’s
death.”61 So, the provoked killer who commits a burglary in
order to commit her killing can be guilty of felony murder.
Let us tighten the hypothetical a bit then. Forget the
burglary. After the defendant witnesses a reasonably
provoking event, the defendant simply points a gun at the
victim and then fires. I submit that under Finkelstein’s
burglary analysis, there is still no merger in this case.
Why? Let us assume that the predicate felony is assault
with a deadly weapon. Now, it certainly seems likely that
death will result here. But as Finkelstein notes, voluntary
human actors break the chain, including voluntary human
actions by the defendant.62 Thus, pointing the gun and
threatening the victim with the gun—those actions that
satisfy the offense definition for assault with a deadly
weapon—do not proximately cause the victim’s death.
Rather, the defendant’s later voluntary action of “pulling
the trigger” causes the death. Thus, assault with a deadly
weapon fails the redescriptive merger test, the defendant’s
pulling the trigger was a second act of killing, and provoked
killings support felony murder liability.
I find these results wildly implausible. From armed
robberies to heart attack cases to instances of voluntary
manslaughter, we are left with a felony murder rule that
does not seem to capture what this admittedly confused
doctrine should.
In summary, Finkelstein does not present a viable
alternative to current merger tests. Finkelstein’s claim—
that felony murder requires both a felony and a killing—is
false, and thus, her test, which rests upon this premise,
fails. Felony murder, after Finkelstein’s merger, is even
more incoherent and arbitrary than it was before. We are
left without the inherently dangerous and in furtherance
limitations, in a world where armed robberies merge but

61. Id. at 236.
62. Id. at 235.
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provoked killings do not. Our current regime may resemble
that of Goldilocks, but Finkelstein asks us to venture into
Wonderland. I suggest we decline her invitation.

